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I n s i d e
Briefing
In the not-too-distant past, American elections got an overhaul. Theproblems identified in the 2000 presidential election with punch-
card voting systems convinced policymakers in state capitals and on
Capitol Hill that change was needed – particularly in the method by
which ballots were designed, cast and counted. 
Bolstered by public discontent and the availability of federal
dollars, voter-rich states including Florida, California and Ohio
replaced older voting systems with touch-screen or scrolling-wheel
electronic voting machines. 
The newer machines offered flexibility and features the older
systems, mostly punch cards, never could – no more over-votes, the
ability to display multiple languages on the same machine, accessibility
for a wide range of voters with disabilities and no more ambiguity
when determining a voter’s intent. 
Machines were bought. Millions of dollars were spent. Votes were
cast. Controversy ensued.
Not long after their introduction, computer scientists, voter
advocacy groups and others called into question the integrity, security
and accuracy of the next generation of voting machines. By 2003, the
calls of computer scientists for further research had blossomed into a
movement. 
Problems at polling places strengthened their arguments and
lawmakers listened. 
Misprogrammed machines in one North Carolina county failed to
record votes, throwing a statewide race into confusion. Statistically
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improbable numbers of under-votes plagued
elections in some Florida counties, including a race
to replace former Congresswoman and Secretary of
State Katherine Harris (R) to represent the 13th
District in the U.S. Congress. 
Further, the security of systems was called into
question in studies conducted by both the private
sector and by government agencies. 
In a growing list of states, the questions turned
to concern. Concern gave way to legislation and
legislation led to more changes at polling places. By
2007, a second overhaul was underway in some
states. The experiment with direct-recording
electronic (DRE) machines would end abruptly or
be phased out. 
Six years, dozens of elections and millions of
dollars after adopting new voting systems, the
migration back to paper is not yet a full-blown
movement. But high-profile bipartisan action to
scrap expensive and recently purchased voting
technology could be the leading edge of a national
effort to return to paper-based elections. Regardless
of how election officials, advocates and voters stand
on the issue – many of whom strongly support
DRE voting and report excellent experiences using
the machines – once the big states have completed
the switch, others are sure to follow. 
In this, the 21st Electionline Briefing, the
decisions by five states to adopt DREs only to
reverse course are explored. Five states that have
adopted DREs only to reverse course are explored.
The case study focuses on California, Colorado,
Florida, New Mexico and Ohio, states that have or
are in the process of moving away from touch-
screen voting and back to paper again, all in a
relatively short period of time. 
By 2007, a second 
overhaul was underway 
in some states.The experiment
with direct-recording electronic
machines would end abruptly 
or be phased out.
Introduction
Executive Summary
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Six years and millions of dollars into a major overhaul
of the U.S. election system, a number of states are
contemplating returning to paper-based voting systems
after failed or troubled experiments with newer voting
technology.
Electronic voting machines were considered the ideal
solution to the problems of punch-card voting shortly
after the troubled 2000 election. Direct-recording
electronic (DRE) machines offer accessibility for people
with disabilities, prevent over-voting and eliminate the
subjectivity of paper-based balloting that plagued the
Florida recount.
But DREs also began to raise questions shortly after
their deployment in major battleground states, including
Florida, Ohio and California as well as in Colorado and
New Mexico.These questions, along with problems at
the polls, prompted decisions to scrap the recently
purchased machines.
More states are primed to follow, including Maryland,
which was among the first in the country to purchase a
statewide DRE voting system, and New York, which will
end more than a century of lever machine usage with
the purchase of optical-scan machines and ballot-
marking devices in 2009.
Reasons for the return to paper varied in each of the
five states that opted to make the switch, but similarities
exist as well. In each circumstance, a top-ranking state
official – the governor or secretary of state – raised
security and accuracy concerns about DRE systems.
Advocates were active as well, questioning the integrity
and auditability of DRE voting. Lawmakers from both
parties eventually embraced change, though frequently
concerns about the replacement cost of purchasing yet
another voting system came from both sides of the aisle.
New Mexico
The state was the first to go from DREs in some
counties and back to paper in 2006, when Gov. Bill
Richardson (D) signed a bill to standardize the state’s
voting to a uniform optical-scan system.
Florida
Many voters in the state will cast ballots on the third
voting system in as many presidential elections in
November 2008. Again, under votes raised concerns
about DREs, and again, a bipartisan response was the
result led by a governor. After spending more than $30
million to replace punch-card voting, another $27.8
million would be spent six years later to buy optical-scan
machines for the 15 counties – including the state’s most
populous – that purchased touch-screen voting machines.
Gov. Charlie Crist (R) led the charge, motivated largely
by more than 18,000 lost votes in Sarasota County in the
race for the 13th U.S. House district.
California
The verified-voting movement got its start among the
state’s computer scientists, and caught on with two
secretaries of state after a number of counties
experienced problems with DREs, because both of
human and machine errors. A “top-to-bottom” review
of the state’s voting system in 2007 led to the
expansion of optical-scan voting and the curtailing of
DRE voting, limiting their deployment to one machine
per polling place in the vast majority of counties.
Ohio
Widespread punch-card use might have contributed to
thousands of invalid ballots in 2000, but the planned
purchase of DRE machines led to concerns about
security and the ability to audit results. As in California,
Ohio’s secretary of state conducted a review of voting
systems, determining that not only were DREs
susceptible to security flaws, but precinct-count optical
scanners were vulnerable as well. Optical-scan ballots,
which will be centrally counted, will be offered as an
alternative in the 2008 primaries in counties that use
electronic voting systems, with a permanent DRE ban
looming as possible for November.
Colorado
While a final decision on voting systems is pending
in the state, a troubled roll-out of DREs and a
lawsuit over how the systems were certified
led to more stringent testing requirements by
incoming Secretary of State Mike Coffman (R)
in 2007. A number of voting
systems, including both DREs and
optical-scan systems were decertified,
to the chagrin of some local election
officials who said they would seek an all-
mail election in November. A bipartisan
bill requiring paper ballots appears
headed for passage in the legislature.
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New Mexico was the first state
to scrap touch-screen voting
machines and move to a uniform
paper-ballot system, a decision that
some say has made the state a
pioneer. 
Following the contested 2000
presidential election, a study by The
Washington Post found that 678
voters who cast their ballots early on
touch-screen voting machines in Rio
Arriba County never had their votes
counted. Al Gore won New Mexico
by 366 votes.1
Although some jurisdictions in
the state had been using older-
generation direct-recording
electronic (DRE) machines for more
than 15 years, some were skeptical.
Santa Fe County Clerk Valerie
Espinoza indicated in 2004 that she
would not purchase any voting
machines that did not provide a
voter-verifiable paper trail.2
Concerns over New Mexico’s
voting systems – a combination of
DREs and optical scanners –
increased when the 2004
presidential contest had one of the
highest rates in the nation of under-
votes and over-votes – nearly 20,000
ballots that did not register or had
more than one vote for president.3
The margin of victory for George
W. Bush was 5,988 votes.
In 2005, Secretary of State
Rebecca Vigil-Giron (D), along with
several voting machine vendors and
local election officials were sued in
federal court (Lopategui, et. al. v. The
State of New Mexico) over the 2004
election. That year, Gov. Bill
Richardson (D) signed legislation
requiring all New Mexico voting
systems to have a voter-verified
paper trail. The legislation also
required post-election audits.4
Nine months later, in January
2006, Richardson announced plans
to standardize the voting systems
throughout New Mexico.5
The plan would require a
standardized, paper-based system in
all 33 counties.6
At the time, there were six
different voting systems being used
in the state. But promises of state
funding for voting machine
purchases softened the blow.
Less than two months later,
Richardson signed the “New
Mexico Make Every Vote Count”
legislation into law.
“Today we are moving New
Mexico from a hodge-podge of
varied voting systems to one, simple,
statewide, all paper-ballot system
using optical scanners to count the
vote – a system that provides
uniform accountability and an
absolute paper trail should there be
any questions regarding the
legitimacy of our vote,” Richardson
said at the signing. “With this step
we will guarantee fair and accurate
elections, insure accessibility for
voters who are disabled and restore
faith in our electoral process.”7
The bipartisan bill included
improved training
for poll workers,
established statewide
standards for provisional
ballots, and simplified absentee
voting as well as increased
tougher enforcement powers for
the secretary of state.
In addition to the $11
New Mexico: Governor Leads Swift
Return to Paper Ballots
million appropriated to fund the
transition, the state also used $9
million in HAVA funds.
By November 7, 2006, less than
a year after requiring paper ballots
in all counties, New Mexico voters
headed to the polls and cast their
ballots on ES&S produced optical-
scan machines.
A study by researchers from the
University of New Mexico, Caltech
and University of Utah about New
Mexico’s election administration
process in 2006 generally lauded the
state, including how it handled the
switch to all paper ballots.
“The reports show a system that
is fundamentally working, where
voter problems are infrequent, and
where voter and poll worker
confidence is generally high,” stated
the project’s authors.8
electionline briefing 5
If a Florida governor declaring
his state would have “an election
system that is a model for the
nation” sounds like déjà vu, it’s
because it has, in fact, happened
before.
Seven years ago, to be exact.
Gov. Jeb Bush (R), just months after
the chaotic recount was ended by
the U.S. Supreme Court and his
brother was sworn into office,
signed the law that would rid the
state of punch-card machines and
lead to uniform vote-counting
standards.
New electronic voting machines
without any paper would have no
hanging or pregnant chad. Over-
votes would be impossible, ballots
would be accessible to voters with a
wide array of disabilities and
confusion and subjectivity would be
relegated to the 20th century.
Gov. Bush declared a turning
point in the Sunshine State.
“This measure will restore
confidence in our election process
and will serve as a model for the rest
of the nation...Floridians have a
voting system that will be the envy
of the country,” Bush said, standing
at a press conference flanked by
then-Secretary of State Katherine
Harris (R).9
Things didn’t turn out quite as
planned. 
In fact, six years later, Bush’s
successor would sign related
legislation, this time barring the use
of the very same electronic voting
machines that had frustrated poll
workers and voters in their early
implementation and later raised
serious concerns about their
reliability and auditability in light of
thousands of unvoted races on
ballots. 
Nearly six years to the day that
Bush signed S.B. 1118, Gov. Charlie
Crist (R) and U.S. Rep. Robert
Wexler, D-Fla., stood together as
H.B. 537 was enacted, effectively
ending the state’s short and trying
experiment with touch-screen
voting.10
It marked the third time in as
many presidential elections that
parts of the state changed voting
systems. Since 2000, the state that
inspired and initiated election
reform has gone from paper to
electronic machines and back again. 
Investment repeated
The move from paper punch
cards to touch-screen direct-
recording electronic (DRE) machines
to optical-scan ballots has been
expensive. Florida invested more
than $30 million after the 2000
election to replace punch-card voting
systems in use in much of the state
with touch-screen systems –
particularly the populous counties in
the southern part of the peninsula.
While some counties had existing
optical-scan systems in place, the
state estimated 65 percent of all
voters cast ballots on new machines
in the September 2002 primaries.11
Less than six years later, the
state will pay another $27.8 million
to change again, this time to
precinct-based optical scanners.12
Statewide, the change only affects
15 counties since the majority of
jurisdictions already use the system.
Yet, just as in 2000, the change
affects the state’s most populous,
including Broward, Miami-Dade,
Sarasota and Palm Beach.13
Under the bill (H.B. 537)
enacted by lawmakers in May 2007
and signed by Crist a few days later,
DRE machines will continue to be
in use for voters with disabilities
until 2012. But all-DRE precincts
and early vote centers in the 15
counties still using touch-screen
systems in 2007 have switched over
to optical-scan for the vast majority
of voters.14
“Every two years, millions of
Americans express their opinion
without fear of consequence,” Crist
said in a release. “People around the
world yearn for this freedom, and
now Floridians will enjoy this
freedom with confidence that their
vote is counted.”15
For some, it could mark the first
time they do that in a long time.
S.B. 1118 represented a
comprehensive overhaul of the
troubled procedures and systems
that led to the historic breakdown in
2000. Signed into law less than six
months after the Bush v. Gore
decision that ended the state’s
chaotic recounts, it banned the use
of punch cards, created uniform
ballot design and recount standards
and set up rules to determine voter
intent.16
Less than a year and a half later,
as Florida prepared for its first
major election since the 2000
Bush/Gore debacle, touch-screen
machines, made by Diebold, ES&S
and Sequoia, were implemented in
15 counties for the 2002 primary
elections. At stake were statewide
Florida: Seven Years Later, the 
‘Envy of the Country’?
offices, including the governorship,
as well as federal offices. Former
U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno
was among those vying for the
Democratic nomination for the
governorship, and public interest
and national attention were both
high for a mid-term race. 
Some were skeptical of Florida’s
new paperless system.
“Replacing the punch card
machines has potential
shortcomings,” stated an August
2001 report from the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights. “First,
local election officials have a limited
choice of voting systems certified by
the Division of Elections. Second,
there is the possibility that a
malfunction or error will not be
corrected because there is no paper
ballot to provide vote verification.”17
‘Hardly state-of-the-art’
The 2002 primaries made some
nostalgic for punch cards almost
immediately after polls were
supposed to open. 
In Broward and Miami-Dade,
polls opened late – some not until
the early afternoon. Machines broke
down throughout the day, with
inexperienced poll workers
unfamiliar with troubleshooting
procedures. Hundreds of voters
complained that they were sent
away without voting because
machine malfunctions had paralyzed
their precincts.18
Miami’s Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) wrote two reports
about the September 2002 primary,
the first noting that in addition to
poll worker training problems and
organizational deficiencies, the
machines did not have the ability to
present three distinct languages as
promised in the original contract
purchase.19
A second report from the OIG
further revealed that the ES&S
machines used in both Miami-Dade
and Broward counties were
equipped with 386 EX processors –
technology first marketed in home
computers in 1986 and by 2002,
long since obsolete. 
“Including the limited flash
memory internal to the [ES&S]
iVotronic, the machines the county
purchased are hardly state-of-the-
art-technology,” the report stated.20
Ed Kast, the state’s election
director at the time, said the
problems were limited to the two
populous South Florida counties.
“We didn’t see problems in 65 of 67
counties…the logistics, planning
and training are the issues that need
to be focused on.”21
Turns out it was a lot more than
that, however. 
Scattered incidents of DRE
voting machine troubles started
becoming the norm rather than the
exception in the state, and sometimes
shortcomings in training and
planning could not adequately explain
the problems. (see Timeline, p. 20)
Under-votes doom DREs
The race to represent the 13th
Congressional district in 2006 was
the galvanizing event. 
While previously reported
problems with machines, poll-
worker training and election
administration could, in the views of
some, be corrected with better
manuals, procedures, testing or
software upgrades, the results of the
Sarasota County election proved to
be the final straw. 
An estimated 18,000 votes were
not recorded on iVotronic
machines, a number that exceeded
the margin of victory for Republican
Vernon Buchanan, who according to
official results, won with fewer than
400 votes in the race to succeed
Rep. Katherine Harris, the
Republican former Secretary of
State who certified the results of the
2000 election.22
Reasons for the huge number of
under-votes varied. Some suggested
that poor ballot design on the county
machines – the race was on the same
screen as the six-person governor
race – could have caused some voters
to miss the race altogether.23
According to Sarasota County
Supervisor of Elections Kathy Dent,
under-votes were intentional. A
bitter, divisive campaign turned off
voters in droves.
Fat chance, said Charles
Scattered incidents of DRE voting machine
troubles started becoming the norm rather
than the exception in the state, and sometimes
shortcomings in training and planning could not
adequately explain the problems.
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Stewart, an MIT computer science
professor and member of the
CalTech/MIT Voting Technology
Project.
“…The under-vote rates in
Sarasota County were substantially
higher than in Charlotte [County]
for both early voting (by 15.3
percentage points) and Election Day
voting (by 11.5 percentage points).
These differences are substantial,
both in a substantive sense and a
statistical sense. These differences
are so large that there is one chance
in 100 million that a difference this
large in under-vote rates among the
early votes could have happened by
chance; there is 1 chance in 5
million that a difference this large in
under-vote rates among Election Day
votes could have happened by
chance,” Stewart wrote.24
Buchanan was eventually
declared the winner in the race. But
the questions over what happened
to 18,000 Sarasota County votes
persisted.
The U.S. Government
Accountability Office became
involved in 2007, issuing a report to
a Congressional task force
investigating the matter in February
2008 indicated the machines most
likely performed as expected. GAO
posited that voters skipped the race,
either because of poor ballot design,
dissatisfaction with both candidates
or some other cause.25
But Sarasota wasn’t the only
county having problems with
machines. 
Press reports indicated that
three other counties – Sumter, Lee
and Charlotte – had high
percentages of under-votes in the
attorney general race. Sumter had
under-votes in 22 percent of all
ballots cast in the race; Lee, 18
percent; in Charlotte, 21 percent.
The counties used the same type of
ES&S voting system as Sarasota.26
Placement of the race on the
ballot was again considered a
possible culprit, as the race was low
on the electronic screen, beneath
the governor’s race. One election
supervisor said she thought voters
were missing the race then failing to
go back and make a choice after the
machine warned them on the review
screen that they had not made a
selection.27
The end of an error? 
Causes aside, Florida politicians
had seen enough. 
Crist, who came into office in
the same election as the missing
Sarasota ballots, said a second wave
of election reform was in order.
Seven years after the Bush-Gore
debacle led to a voting overhaul in
the state, the Sunshine State’s
election system could hardly be
considered the “envy of the
country,” as Gov. Jeb Bush declared
in 2001. 
During a February 2007
meeting of the Voters’ Coalition in
Delray Beach, Crist said he would
recommend more than $30 million
for the purchase of a “verifiable
paper trail of Florida’s voting
system.”28
Retrofitting touch-screen
machines with printers to provide
paper verification was ruled out by
the time the legislature passed a bill
in early May. The budget to replace
DREs was pared down to $28
million that would be covered by
the Help America Vote Act. 
For the 15 counties still using
DREs, changes would have to be
made before the federal election in
November 2008. Sarasota County,
the primary inspiration for the
state’s second round of election
overhauls, would make the switch
earlier, having optical scans on hand
for the January 29 presidential
primary.29
Touch-screens would continue
to be available for voters with
disabilities until 2012, at which
point, they too would have to be
replaced. “Ballot-on-demand” –
which allows the printing of optical-
scan ballots tailored to each voter’s
specific local races – would be
deployed at early-voting sites.30
And Florida voters, at least in
the 15 affected counties, would cast
ballots on the third voting system in
as many presidential elections after
the state decided DREs raised more
questions than they offered answers
to the state’s nagging voting
troubles. 
The decision was hailed by
Republicans and Democrats, as well
as voting integrity groups, the
League of Women Voters and hosts
of others. 
“Governor Crist and the state
legislature have come together and
delivered an election system that is a
model for the nation,” said Wexler.
“One person, one vote – guaranteed
– with a paper record to prove it.”31
In March 2002 California voters
approved a $200 million bond act
allowing counties to update their
voting systems.32
During the discussions about
what voting systems should be
considered, some grew concerned
that election officials might select
paperless DRE voting machines.
“I could not see how it was
possible, given the current state of
computer science, to make a
trustworthy paperless machine,” said
David Dill, a Stanford University
computer science professor. “So, I
started asking experts, and no one
could explain to me how it was
done, either.”33
Dill conferred with others in the
technology field and authored the
“Resolution on Electronic Voting.”
“Voting machines should not be
purchased or used unless they
provide a voter-verifiable audit
trail,” the document stated.34
In January 2003, Dill began
collecting petition signatures and
within a few months had signatures
from about 200 prominent
computer scientists and security
experts. Concerned citizens in fields
other than technology wanted to
add their signatures as well so Dill
opened up the petition to the
general public. Ultimately, more
than 10,000 people signed.35
That February, Santa Clara
County became the first in the
country to buy a touch-screen
voting system that printed a paper
record of each voter’s ballot.36 That
same month, Secretary of State
Kevin Shelley (D) announced the
formation of a special task force to
study electronic voting37 and that
the state would receive $195 million
from the Help America Vote Act to
update voting systems.38
Paper trail movement and
DRE decertification gain
momentum
A state-sponsored task force
released a report in July 2003.
While they could not come to
consensus on the need for a voter-
verified paper audit trail (VVPAT),
the task force agreed that “the
creation of the permanent paper
record, if it is not a VVPAT, should
be done once all ballots are cast.”39
The findings led Shelley to
declare that, as of July 2005,
counties and cities could only buy
voting systems that included a
VVPAT. Touch-screen voting
systems without VVPATs could not
be used after July 2006. Shelley
explained that the lag time was
necessary to allow for system
certification, poll worker and
election official training and voter
education.40
“As the state progresses with
new technology, all Californians
must have confidence that every
vote cast is a vote counted,” Shelley
said. “These new requirements will
provide this confidence.”41
The March 2004 presidential
preference primary did not inspire
confidence. 
Poll workers at 20 percent of
the polls in Alameda County had
difficulties with vote-card encoders
and voters were told to use paper
ballots, go to a different polling
place or return later.42 Similarly,
encoders failed in San Diego. Back-
up paper ballots were not available.43
In Orange County, poll worker
error led to as many as 7,000 voters
casting the wrong ballots.44
Counting software in San Diego
gave several thousand of Sen. John
Kerry’s votes in the Democratic
presidential primary to Rep. Dick
Gephardt, who had already dropped
out of the race.45
Following the primary, a state
advisory committee recommended
that the 10 counties using touch-
screens continue using them only in
conjunction with paper ballots.46
Shelley then banned the use of all
touch-screen voting systems unless
election officials either added a
paper trail or met 23 additional
security measures for re-
certification.47
On June 4, Shelley announced
the first set of standards for paper
trails in the country and called on
the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission to establish nationwide
standards.48
“These standards will be used
by voting system manufacturers to
develop the next generation of
California’s electronic voting
machines,” Shelley said. “These will
also establish the baseline for testing
those systems to determine if they
should be state certified.”49
Shelley’s move to decertify
angered some county election
officials. Conny McCormack, Los
Angeles County registrar said, “He
put out a report saying that touch
screens were 100 percent accurate.
And then two days later he
decertified them.’’50
California:A Pioneer in Adopting,
Questioning and Banning Machines
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Indeed, Shelley’s office found
that touch screens were precise in
random tests during the primary.51
His decision to decertify led to
lawsuits but Shelley quickly
recertified systems in Merced,
Orange, Santa Clara, Shasta,
Tehama, and Napa counties once
they complied with new security
precautions.52 On August 24, Shelley
announced that electronic voting
systems in all other counties had
been recertified.53 Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger (R) signed
legislation in September that
required all e-voting machines
include a paper record by 2006.54
Meanwhile, Bill Lockyer, the
Democratic state attorney general
prepared a lawsuit against Diebold
for defrauding the state by making
false claims about its products.
Shelley said that Diebold’s
aggressive marketing drove election
officials to purchase voting
equipment that had not been tested
or certified.55 The suit was settled in
December 2004.
In January 2005, Shelley certified
the first voting system with VVPAT,
the AVC Edge with VeriVote printer
by Sequoia Voting Systems.56
Bowen brings top-to-
bottom review
Election reform slowed down
significantly in the state when
Shelley’s tenure was cut short by
scandal. Schwarzenegger appointed
Bruce McPherson, a Republican
state legislator to replace Shelley in
March 2005. Debra Bowen, a
former Democratic state senator
became secretary of state after she
narrowly won the election over
McPherson in November 2006.57
During her campaign, Bowen
promised to scrutinize electronic
voting machines.58
“California counties have spent
hundreds of millions of dollars on
new voting equipment but there are
reports questioning their
accessibility, questions about the
reliability of electronic voting
systems, questions about the
training poll workers get to manage
the high-tech equipment,” she
said.”59
Bowen appointed Lowell Finley,
an attorney who had previously sued
voting machine manufacturers, to be
deputy secretary of state. Finley led
a group that sued McPherson to
block his approval of a Diebold
voting system.60
In March, Bowen’s office issued
draft criteria of a top-to-bottom
review of voting systems focusing on
security concerns, accessibility for
minority language voters and voters
with disabilities and usability for
both poll workers and election
officials.61
However, concerns about the
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Shelley said that Diebold’s
aggressive marketing drove
election officials to 
purchase voting 
equipment that had not 
been tested or certified.
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review’s timing arose when
Schwarzenegger and the state
legislature moved the 2008
presidential primary to February.
County election officials warned
Bowen that major changes in
elections in a short time span could
potentially destabilize elections.62
State officials in May said they
would be working with the
University of California to bring
together three different teams to
study the systems’ documents,
source code and perform
penetration attacks. A separate team
would assess the systems’
accessibility. Bowen’s office expected
the review to cost $1.8 million and
planned to fund it with money from
HAVA and voting system vendors.63
Preliminary review results came
in July when the teams released
their report noting experts were
able to break into every voting
machine being tested. Matt Bishop,
the University of California–Davis
computer science professor who led
the team assessing vulnerability said
that he was surprised by how easy it
was to break into the machines,
adding that his team would have
been able to find more problems if
they had had more time.64
Steve Weir, Contra Costa
County registrar and head of the
California Association of Clerks and
Election Officials, challenged the
relevance of the review. Review
team members had operating
manuals, source code and software
for the machines, as well as
unlimited access to them, which
Weir said “is like giving a burglar
the keys to your house.” 
The reviewers did not make any
judgments about the feasibility of
any attacks.65
“This was not a security-risk
evaluation but an unrealistic, worst-
case scenario evaluation,” Steven
Bennett, Sequoia Voting Systems’
spokesman said at a public hearing. 
“We’re concerned about
extreme actions being taken. We
urge the secretary to ... refrain from
precipitous action until all the
relevant information is in,” added
Deborah Seiler, San Diego County’s
registrar.66
In August, six months until
California’s February 2008
presidential primary, Bowen
decertified then conditionally
recertified the systems evaluated by
the review.67 While Bowen allowed
the continued use of e-voting
machines, she limited them to one
per polling place for voters with
disabilities and all votes cast on
touch-screens must be recounted by
hand after the election.68 One type of
system employed in the counties, the
eSlate, could still be used as the
primary voting system.
Bowen also received criticism
from election reform advocates who
oppose all electronic voting. 
Alan Dechert, Open Voting
Consortium president said that
Bowen was caving to pressure from
voting machine vendors and election
officials in allowing some machines
to still be used. 
“She is not requiring any
changes in the software or hardware
used. This is not why we elected
her,” he said.69
“When the government finds a
car is unsafe, it orders a recall. Here
we’re talking about systems used to
cast and tally votes, the most basic
tool of democracy,” Bowen said at a
December conference sponsored by
electionline.org.70
Since the top-to-bottom review,
San Diego, San Bernardino and
Santa Clara Counties have all put
thousands of voting machines in
storage. In Riverside County, 3,000
electronic voting machines that cost
about $25 million have been placed
in storage as well. During a
November test run of paper ballots
through scanners in San Bernardino,
election officials found they could
handle 10,000 voters per hour, so it
may take as long as 17 hours,
starting at 10 p.m. on election night,
to scan the anticipated 175,000
ballots, Kari Verjil, registrar said.71
“It seems like every time we get
a new secretary of state there is a
new voting system. Who’s to say
what will happen in four years if we
get another secretary of state,” Verjil
said.72
“I am committed to helping
Ohio deliver its electoral votes to
the president next year.’’73
These words, written by then-
Diebold Inc. CEO Walden O’Dell
in a 2003 fundraising letter to like-
minded supporters of President
George W. Bush marked a seismic
shift in the debate over electronic
voting machines in Ohio and across
the country. 
Existing skepticism about the
security and reliability of direct
recording electronic (DRE) voting
systems crystallized and technology
that some saw as the solution to the
troubles of the 2000 election
became the growing focus of
potential problems for future votes.
More than four years, two
troubled elections and several voting
system risk assessment reports later,
Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer
Brunner (D) recommended the state
scrap both DREs and precinct-
count optical scanners (PCOS) that
tally paper ballots by November
2008.74 In the meantime, for the
March 2008 primary, counties still
using electronic voting machines
with voter-verified paper audit trails
(VVPATs) are required to provide
voters the option of casting their
ballots on paper.75
For several Ohio counties this
will be the third type of voting
system in place since 2004. And
many of these counties are less than
four years removed from the days of
punch-card ballots.
Punch cards out, DREs
deployed after delays
While Florida withered under
the glare of the national spotlight in
2000 with its hanging, dangling and
pregnant chad further north, Ohio
also had thousands of punch-card
ballots that could not be counted,
though without much public notice. 
With a much larger margin of
victory – 165,019 votes – by George
W. Bush than in Florida the state
did not face the scrutiny the
Sunshine State did. However, there
were 93,991 ballots cast that were
invalid, according to the Ohio
secretary of state’s office, and many
of those were punch cards.76
In October 2002 the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of
Ohio filed a lawsuit against the state
for using punch cards, arguing that
the use of the ballots in some
counties and not in others violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment.77
The state did not wait for the
outcome of the lawsuit, which the
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Ohio: Moving Back to Paper,
Facing Resistance
While Florida withered 
under the glare of the 
national spotlight in 2000 
with its hanging, dangling and pregnant
chad, further north, Ohio also quietly
had thousands of punch-card ballots
that could not be counted.
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ACLU eventually won in 2006. In
May 2003 the state issued a request
for proposal (RFP) for vendors to
supply the state with DRE voting
systems with the goal of replacing
punch cards by March 2004.78
However, after qualifying
vendors in July 2003, the end of the
month saw the first of several delays
in the final selection and
deployment of any new DREs
because the state wanted to perform
more in-depth security reviews of
the voting systems.79
In late 2003, two state-
sponsored reports were issued, one
of which cited 57 potential security
risks with the technology. The
findings delayed deployment of the
systems until August 2004.80 By the
middle of 2004 a follow-up report
was issued and plans to have all
counties switch to touch-screen
voting systems even by November
2004 were delayed. At the same
time, a state law was enacted
requiring DRE voting systems to
include VVPATs.81
The enactment left 69 of Ohio’s
88 counties using punch-card ballots
in 2004.82
The first half of 2005 saw more
delays, as well as legal action from a
vendor over the selection process.83
By the November election, 44
counties had touch-screen voting
systems in place with paper trails.
That number increased to 57 six
months later.84 Their debut in
Cuyahoga County during the 2006
primary did nothing to instill
confidence in the new systems.
While the county experienced
numerous election administration
problems, one of the most startling
was with the Diebold voting system
and its VVPATs. 
One study found that 10
percent of the VVPATs were not
usable or readable due to printer
jams or other problems.85 It was
particularly problematic because in
Ohio, like in most states that
require VVPATs, the VVPAT is the
official ballot of record.86
A new secretary of state, a
fresh look at voting systems
Secretary of State Jennifer
Brunner (D), assumed office after
the November 2006 election. A
former election lawyer and judge,
Brunner replaced J. Kenneth
Blackwell (R) who left office in an
unsuccessful bid to become
governor. 
In June 2007, Brunner issued an
RFP for outside consultants to
perform a risk assessment study of
Ohio’s voting systems. After
selecting the consultants, the testing
was performed from October to
early December.87
During the testing period,
November elections took place and
again Cuyahoga County had
problems, this time tallying the
votes. The server that was
performing the ballot count crashed
several times as the night wore on.
And when 10 races
needed to be recounted, it
was discovered that 20 percent
of the machines with these races
did not have VVPATs for some of
the votes due to paper jams.88
In December 2007, Brunner
released the report of the risk
assessment titled Evaluation and
Validation of Election Related
Equipment, Standards and Testing,
or EVEREST. The report found
“critical security failures” in the
voting systems. Brunner
recommended eliminating DREs
and precinct-count optical scan
systems by November 2008 and
moving to central-count optical scan
(CCOS) voting technology. Soon
after she directed all counties using
DREs to offer optically scanned
paper ballots for the March 2008
primary.89
Less than two weeks after the
report’s release, Brunner cast a tie-
breaking vote for the Cuyahoga
County Board of Elections to have
that jurisdiction move to CCOS
voting technology by the March
primary.90
Central count technology
raises concerns
Election officials and observers
expressed concerns about the move
to a CCOS system – where the
paper ballots are not counted at the 
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polls and stored on memory cards
like with a PCOS system, but rather
transported to a central location and
counted there. The PCOS system
and DREs can alert voters to over
and under-votes. Centrally-counted
ballots do not afford voters the same
opportunity. 
The EVEREST report offered
the state’s justification: “…The
elimination from polling locations
of vote recording and tabulation
machines such as DREs and
precinct-based optical scan
machines (except to use optical-scan
machines for determining over-
votes and under-votes to satisfy
HAVA ‘second chance’
requirements) and instead migrating
to central counting of ballots,
ensures greater stability to the
computer-based voting systems,
because it eliminates multiple points
of entry to a system not adequately
secured.”91
Larry Norden, the director of
the Voting Technology Assessment
Project at the Brennan Center for
Justice at New York University
School of Law, praised the report
for its focus on the security and
reliability flaws of DREs but raised
several points of concern about
Brunner’s plan.
“The exclusive use of central
count optical scanners to count
votes is likely to cause the
disenfranchisement of thousands of
voters, and in particular low-income
and minority voters. Central count
optical scanners do not give voters
the notice and opportunity to
correct errors. In-precinct DRE and
PCOS voting systems have
dramatically decreased the number
of uncounted votes, previously
caused when voters made errors by
inadvertently overvoting in
elections. Second, counting all votes
in a central location without the
benefit of precinct totals is a recipe
for massive error, particularly if
there is no post-election audit of the
central count optical scanner (which
is not part of the Secretary’s
recommendations).”92
After hearing similar concerns
from voter advocates and election
officials, Brunner backed off the
central count requirement by
November 2008. However, that
requirement is still in place in
Cuyahoga County.93
Cuyahoga County faces
challenging timeline
The county, with more than 1
million registered voters, has had
less than three months to lease a
new central count system, train poll
workers, and then educate voters
about the system, among other
tasks. For the March election, the
county is estimating it will have
about 60 PCOS systems placed
randomly at polling places for voters
to check for over and undervotes -
not at all polling places.94
The ACLU filed suit in
Cuyahoga over this issue citing the
aforementioned concerns of the
Brennan Center and stating, “Every
voting system – paper ballot or not
– must give voters a chance to fix a
mistake. Many votes will go
uncounted if voters cannot verify
that their ballots have been filled
out correctly.”95
Brunner criticized the ACLU’s
action. 
“They’re a bit tardy in filing
this lawsuit. The closer we get to
the election the tougher it’s going to
be for a judge to deny the voters of
Cleveland the right to vote in a
presidential primary,” she said.96
A judge agreed, denying the
ACLU’s motion.
Candice Hoke of Cleveland
State’s Center for Election Integrity,
which has been the public monitor
of Cuyahoga County election reform
since 2006, stated that the
compressed timeframe for
implementing the change is not
ideal.
“It’s going to be problematic
because you can’t anticipate
everything in this short time. There
are still many, many details to be
worked out,” Hoke said.97
Questions about cost, election
results and poll workers
Some of these details include
cost, reporting election results and
training poll workers.
Estimates put the price tag at
$31 million statewide for the
transition to the new system. Some
have suggested using the state’s
rainy day fund, which has more than
$1 billion, but Gov. Ted Strickland
(D) has objected. Another possibility
is money that will be allocated to
states this year through HAVA.98
County election officials also
said they worry about the cost of
adding paper ballots as an option for
March.
The 50-plus counties that have
DREs will need to have a minimum
Ohio
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number of paper ballots amounting
to 10 percent of the ballots cast in
previous presidential primaries.99
Matt Damschroder (R),
Franklin County election director
stated, though, that he received a
legal opinion from the county
prosecutor saying state law requires
more paper ballots at the polls –
enough for all registered voters in
each precinct plus one percent.
Secretary Brunner disagrees with
this position. Damschroder said this
could cost his county $200,000.100
Potential delays in counting
votes if large numbers of voters use
paper ballots are also a concern. If
some portion of the ballots are not
correctly filled out and cannot be
read by the scanners, county boards
will have to examine them and
decide if the ballots should be
remade and scanned.101
And of course all changes in
systems and procedures have to be
learned by those on the front lines
of election day - the poll workers. 
“I think you’re adding a whole new
level of confusion for the poll
workers. These people are maxed
out,’’ said Portage County Elections
Director Lois Enlow (R). “They
have so many responsibilities. Over
the last several years since 2002, it’s
been major, major changes at every
election.’’102
Supporters acknowledge the
new system might not be ideal, but
see it as more transparent than the
touch-screen technology. 
“All of these systems are
flawed,” Cuyahoga County
Commissioner Tim Hagan said. “All
of these new technologies are
questionable, as is the one we are
going to adopt. There’s no question
about that. I think it’s less
questionable. It’s not a perfect
system.”103
A majority of county election
officials, though, don’t have
concerns about their current voting
systems and don’t want to change,
according to a survey conducted by
the secretary of state’s office.104
Brunner has stated she is willing
to work with election officials, but
stands firm on getting rid of touch
screens in Ohio. 
“While the state’s elections
officials have important views to
consider, the bottom line is that we
must do what is best for the voters
in this state to ensure that anyone
who is eligible and wants to vote
may do so without having to wait in
long lines to vote on machines that
have been shown to be substandard
and vulnerable to performance and
security problems.”105
Ohio
“I think you’re adding a whole new level 
of confusion for the poll workers.These 
people are maxed out,’’ said Portage County 
Elections Director Lois Enlow (R). “They have 
so many responsibilities. Over the last several years since
2002, it’s been major, major changes at every election.’’
Colorado:A Rocky Road to Paper
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To say Colorado’s voting system
situation was in a state of flux in the
first quarter of 2008 would be a
monumental understatement.
By the beginning of February,
Secretary of State Mike Coffman
(R) had decertified the majority of
the voting systems used in
Colorado, county clerks were
demanding an all vote-by-mail
election in November 2008, the
state legislature was considering
legislation to allow Coffman to test
and recertify the machines and the
governor and legislators were
hoping to fast-track legislation that
would bring paper ballots statewide
in time for the November election.
But before the state got to this
point, there was a lot of history
surrounding Colorado’s voting
system tug-of-war.
Shortly after the 2000
presidential election, then-Secretary
of State Donetta Davidson formed a
task force to review the state’s
election laws.106
By the time the 2004 election
season rolled around, a number of
jurisdictions were using new voting
systems including optical-scan
machines and DRE machines. 
However, all was not well in
Colorado. 
A post-election audit of local
elections by the Secretary of State’s
office found that ballots were not
counted in some jurisdictions,
including Garfield County, where a
school levy and district council race
were both won by 10 votes or less.107
As problems persisted, the state
legislature took up a bill in March
of 2005 that would require all
voting systems approved in
Colorado to provide a voter-verified
paper trail. The legislation was
approved by both bodies in May
2005 and signed by the governor in
June.108
In early 2006, then-Secretary of
State Gigi Dennis (D) certified
several different voting systems
including those manufactured by
Hart InterCivic, Diebold (now
Premier) and Sequoia.109
A troubled roll out
By November of that year, a
majority of Colorado voters used
electronic voting machines for the
first time. Problems large and small
were reported in a number of
counties.
In Douglas County, electronic
voting machines crashed at vote
centers when voters tried to produce
hard copies of their completed
ballots.110 The crashes, and
inadequate supply of voting
machines, had some Douglas
County residents waiting in line for
up to four hours to cast a ballot.
While the finger-pointing and
calls for firings came from all areas,
Douglas County Clerk and
Recorder Carole Murray was one of
the few to shoulder some of the
blame.
“There are a lot of angry people
out there and I don’t blame them. I
would be angry too because the
voting process is sacred,” Murray
said. “I offer my apologies and I
want you to know I didn’t measure
up the way I needed to.”111
In early 2007, Coffman began
his tenure as secretary of state and
immediately set to work on coming
up with new testing requirements
for electronic voting machines. He
held public hearings to discuss the
matter and worked with advocates,
citizens and technology experts.
The new testing procedures
were adopted under the secretary’s
rulemaking authority and are known
as Rule 45. The rule is comprised of
46 pages of requirements for voting
systems certification, including
detailed security standards for all
voting systems. The rule was
adopted by the secretary of state in
response to a court order, Conroy v.
Dennis.112
Under the new testing
procedures, the certification process
involves 437 functional tests that a
voting system will need to pass in
order to be certified for use in
Colorado. During the recertification
process, the secretary of state’s office
produced almost 2,000 pages of
documentation in the evaluation of
each voting system.113
“The recertification process will
be tough, but fair,” Coffman said at
the time. “My focus is on ensuring
that the electronic machines used in
our elections are secure, are able to
accurately count every vote, and that
the results can be verified.
Electronic voting machines that
meet this threshold will be
recertified for use in Colorado’s
elections.”114
In December 2007, Coffman
announced that as a result of vote-
system testing he was decertifying
Sequoia Edge II and Edge II Plus
voting machines as well as the
optical-scan devices eScan and
Colorado
electionline briefing16
BallotNow, manufactured by Hart
and ES&S as well as the iVotronic
electronic-voting machine.115
“I had to strictly follow the law
along with the court order,” said
Coffman. “If I’m too lenient in
determining what passes then I risk
having the state taken to court by
activists groups who will ask for an
injunction on the use of electronic
voting machines for the 2008
election, and if I exceed the
requirements of state law and the
court order, then I will be sued by
the vendors who manufacture and
sell the equipment.”116
Coffman’s decertification, not
only of electronic voting machines,
but also of certain scanners used to
count optical-scan ballots, set off a
maelstrom in Colorado.
County clerks statewide cried
foul and joined forces to petition
Coffman to allow an all vote-by-
mail election for the November
2008 general election. The state
legislature took up a measure that
would allow Coffman to retest and
possibly recertify the machines in
enough time so that they might be
used in November.
And less than 10 days after
decertifying the machines Coffman
himself publicly made an appeal to
the state legislature to move to all
paper ballots.
“I have more confidence in
having votes cast on paper ballots at
the polls rather than relying
exclusively on electronic voting
machines or in voting by mail. If
Douglas County had paper ballots
available for voters at their vote
centers in the 2006 mid-term
election they would not have the
distinction of having the last vote
cast in the country sometime after 
1 a.m. on the following day.” said
Coffman.117
In late January, bipartisan
legislation was introduced that
would bring paper ballots to all
counties in Colorado.
“Paper ballots are a tried-and-
true election method that has
worked for decades. They ensure a
verifiable paper trail and minimize
the possibility of technology failures
that have caused Election Day
problems in the past,” Gov. Bill
Ritter (D) said, in support of the
legislation. “Our democracy
depends not only on the people’s
ability to vote, but also on their
confidence that every vote
counts.”118
At press time, some machines
were undergoing testing that could
lead to re-certification.
Coffman’s decertification,
not only of electronic voting
machines, but also
of certain scanners
used to count optical-scan
ballots, set off a 
maelstrom in Colorado.
Requirements for Paper Usage in Voting
Systems – January 2008
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This map details usage of paper as a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) for use with direct-recording electronic
(DRE) voting systems and requirements for paper-based balloting. The map does not intend to show prevalence of
voting systems, but rather state requirements concerning verification.
Notes:
Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland and South Carolina use DRE systems statewide for all polling place voters. All other
states with DREs use them in some, not all jurisdictions.
Arkansas: Uses DREs both with and without VVPATs.
Florida: State law allows voters with disabilities to use touch-screen systems until 2012.
Idaho: Some counties use punch-card voting systems.
Iowa: Some jurisdictions employ DREs without VVPATs. State lawmakers are debating how to meet the paper trail requirement.
Maryland: State law requires voter-verifiable paper records by 2010.
New Jersey: The state’s initial deadline for DREs to have VVPATs by January 1, 2008 has been delayed by six months.
New York: The state has a VVPAT requirement but lever voting machines are still in place. Almost all counties plan to adopt
paper-based voting systems by 2009.
Oregon: Holds all vote-by-mail elections.
Washington: 37 of 39 counties hold all vote-by-mail elections.
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Back to the (Paper) Future: More States
Look Ahead to Changes 
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Now that five states, including
two of the nation’s most populous,
have moved from paper to
electronic machines and back again,
where will the other dominoes fall?
The question of whether the days of
paperless voting are ending soon has
not definitively been answered. 
Plenty of determination, not
a lot of cash in Maryland
Maryland, among the first of
three states to scrap punch cards in
favor of DRE systems after the 2000
vote (Florida and Georgia were the
others), could scrap the state’s $55
million Diebold AccuVote TS
voting system in time for the 2010
gubernatorial election.119 SB 392/HB
18 was approved by lawmakers and
signed in April.120
Financial concerns have
hampered attempts to meet that
time table, however. Budget cuts
proposed in late 2007 included
hacking more than $3.3 million
from the State Board of Elections.121
“It would mean no new voting
system would be implemented,” said
Linda Lamone, the state’s election
director, in a news report.122
Not that it would necessarily
trouble Lamone or other election
officials in the state. Lamone has
consistently supported the paperless
system at home and on the national
stage for the National Association of
State Election Directors. 
“I think the system is fabulous,”
Lamone told The Washington Post.
“It’s probably the most secure
system in the country.”123
She even took on former Gov.
Robert L. Ehrlich Jr. (R), who
despite agreeing to purchase the
Diebold DREs early in his term,
said they presented “a lot to be
concerned about,” adding, “we want
to make sure this new technology is
not used to undermine fairness.”124
But her support was matched by
skepticism and sharp criticism of the
system. 
A coalition of Maryland
organizations pushing for voter-
verified paper ballots – including the
ACLU, NAACP, the League of
Women Voters and others – said the
state had “the least secure and least
transparent” election system in the
country.125
At press time, the fate of
Maryland’s optical scan purchase
was not yet settled. Voter integrity
groups, including TrueVoteMD and
other grassroots organizations were
lobbying Gov. Martin O’Malley (D)
to leave the funding in place for the
optical-scan machines. The Baltimore
Sun chimed in as well, urging that
the $3.3 million needed for the
switch be retained in the budget. 
O’Malley left money in his 2009
budget, but the fate of the plan was
still unclear at press time. 
A long goodbye in Virginia
Virginia has banned the future
purchases of touch-screen DRE
machines as part of plan to phase
out the system, now in use as the
exclusive system in more than two-
thirds of the state’s voting
jurisdictions.126
S.B. 840, introduced in the
2007 legislative session, requires the
replacement of DRE systems “as the
devices in operation wear out.”127
According to estimates from some
local election officials it could be
more than 10 years before the
current batch needs to be retired.128
The plan has its critics,
particularly from the ranks of the
state’s electoral board and from
registrars from across the state.
Organizations representing both
urged Gov. Timothy Kaine (D) to
delay endorsing S.B. 840 until it
became clearer what members of
Congress would do with
outstanding legislation on voter-
verified paper audit trails.129
A move toward paper in
New York
After flirting with choosing a
number of different voting systems
to replace aged lever machines in
use statewide, New York officials
announced in January 2008 that
they would implement new voting
systems in 2009.
New York differs substantially
from the other states in the case
study, as piecemeal reform in the
state – and non-compliance with
federal law – has meant the state
was the last to make federally-
mandated changes to elections. 
Further, New York’s move
might not be considered a move
“back to paper.” But historians do
recall that the state used paper
ballots before the phase-in of lever
machines in the late 19th century.130
County officials will have a
choice of one of a number of
models of optical scan machines/
ballot-marking devices for voters
with disabilities this fall. All are
paper-based, and, in the words of
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Back to the (Paper) Future
There is momentum in some 
states to go back to paper…there’s
also an emerging consensus that the
current generation of toilet-paper
paper trails with DRE systems
don’t work well.
– Dan Tokaji, associate professor of law,
The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
one advocate, “a low-tech
solution.”131 A decision on voting
systems for the rest of the state
should be announced in late
February or March.
Momentum building?
New Jersey is working on
retrofitting existing DRE machines
by the middle of this year. Iowa
lawmakes are debating whether to
retrofit DRE machines or move to
paper-based systems. Other
legislatures will almost certainly
debate paper trail or paper-based
voting systems during this year’s
sessions. 
But not everyone agrees that
the dominoes will continue to fall. 
Bills to move Georgia from its
paperless DRE system to optical-
scan or a paper-trail retrofit have
been unsuccessful in the past few
years. Seven bills that would have
required voter-verified paper audit
trails (VVPATs) with the state’s
DREs were left sitting in legislative
limbo in the state since 2005.132
Advocates for voters with
disabilities and elections officials find
plenty to like about paperless
systems. Paper, they contend,
increases the possibility of error.
Paperless machines allow voters with
disabilities to vote in the same
manner as everyone else. They allow
for multiple languages and eliminate
over-votes (while, some might
contend, increasing under-votes). 
“There is momentum in some
states to go back to paper…there’s
also an emerging consensus that the
current generation of toilet-paper
paper trails with DRE systems don’t
work well,” said Dan Tokaji, an
associate professor of law at The
Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law. “On the other
hand, electronic voting is popular
with many election officials, not to
mention voters. DREs allow for
easier access for disabled and non-
English proficient voters. They’re
also a more attractive option for in-
person early voting and vote
centers. So I don’t think we’ve seen
the death of DREs, though I don’t
expect we’ll see too many places
moving to the current DRE with
VVPAT systems.”133
January: Gov. Jeb
Bush (R) signs “Florida
Election Reform Act,”
ridding the state of
punch-card voting
systems by 2002.
Uniform ballot design
and recount standards
also included.
September: Counties deploy
DRE machines for the first
time. Significant problems –
including widespread machine
and human error – plague
the vote in South Florida
counties, including Miami-
Dade and Broward.
November: Exhaustive
preparations for the general
election yield a smoother
election.
November: Disputed
recount begins. Punch-
card counting standards
vary by county.
December: Supreme
Court offers opinion in
Bush v. Gore, ending
Florida recount; George
W. Bush wins with
Florida’s electoral votes.
November: Under-votes in
the presidential election dropped
to 0.4 percent. Over-votes and
under-votes in the state
accounted for 3 percent of all
cast in the 2000 presidential
election.
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November: Assembly
Speaker Robert Hertzberg
(D) proposes a $300
million plan to update
voting technology.
Secretary of State Bill
Jones (R) presents a
$230 million plan to
replace punch-cards with
touch screen voting
machines.
April: Gov. Bill Richardson (D) signs legislation
requiring all voting systems in the state to
print a voter-verified paper trail. The legislation
also requires post-election audits.
November: Secretary of State Rebecca Vigil-
Giron (D), several voting machine vendors and
some local elections officials are sued in federal
court (Lopategui et al v. the State of New
Mexico) over the use of electronic voting
machines in the November 2004 presidential race.
June: Colorado General Assembly passes
legislation requiring that all voting systems in
the state print a voter-verified paper trail.
November: Most
voters cast punch-card
ballots in the
presidential election.
October: ACLU of Ohio
sues the state for continued
use of punch cards, arguing
their use in some counties
and not in others violates
the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment.
May: The state solicits bids for DRE voting
systems to replace punch cards by March 2004.
August: Vendor selection delayed for in-depth
security reviews of voting systems.
December: State releases full findings of
security review performed by Compuware citing 57
potential security concerns. Deployment of new
systems is delayed.
May: Gov.Robert Taft (R) signs
bill requiring DRE systems have
VVPATs.
July: Last counties considering
using DRE systems for 2004
general election are blocked from
doing so.
November: Voters in a
majority of counties again cast
punch-card ballots.
April: ACLU sues Jones
for using ''flawed and
discriminatory voting
systems,” alleging punch-
card voting systems
inaccurately tally votes
and are used in counties
disproportionately
populated by minorities,
violating their civil
rights.
September: State
lawmakers approve a
$200 million matching
grant program to assist
counties with the
purchase of new voting
systems. Jones orders
nine counties, including
Los Angeles, to upgrade
their voting systems by
2006.
March: California voters
approve the Voting
Modernization Bond Act,
allowing counties to spend
$200 million upgrading their
voting equipment.
September: Gov. Gray
Davis (R) approves AB 2525,
requiring every polling place
to have at least one voting
machine completely accessible
to blind and visually-
impaired voters.
January: Santa Clara County Board of
Supervisors Finance and Government Committee
meets to discuss plans to buy a paperless
electronic voting system from Sequoia. David Dill,
computer science professor from Stanford
University and Kim Alexander from the California
Voter Foundation both testify about security
concerns and the need for a paper trail. The
committee postpones their voting-system decision.
February: Secretary of State Kevin Shelley (D),
in response to concerns aired at the hearing in
Santa Clara County, creates the Ad Hoc Touch
Screen Voting Task Force. Santa Clara County
became first in the country to buy VVPAT-equipped
touch screens.
May: More than 100 computer scientists sign a
petition circulated by Dill calling for stronger
security measures for electronic voting and a
voter-verifiable audit trail.
July: Shelley releases Ad Hoc Touch-screen Task
Force Report.
November: Shelley halts certification of
Diebold’s latest touch-screen machines. He also
announces no voting machines may be purchased
after July 2005 without a voter-verifiable paper
audit trail (VVPAT) and all voting machines by
July 2006 must have a VVPAT.
March: More than half of San
Diego’s polling places failed to
open on time because of
problems with Diebold voting
machines.
April: A report released by
Shelley’s office states that Diebold
sold counties new voting
equipment before it was federally
or state approved and installed
uncertified software in voting
machines. Shelley bans the use of
more than 14,000 Diebold
electronic voting machines and
decertifies more than 28,000
other voting machines unless
they are used with extra security
precautions.
June: Shelley issues standards
for voting machine vendors
developing systems with paper
trails, including accessibility and
alternate language requirements.
September: Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger (R) signs a law
requiring that all voting machines
produce a VVPAT by 2006.
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January: Secretary of State J. Kenneth
Blackwell (R) issues directive ordering counties
to select on optical scan voting system.
April: Blackwell issues new directive
allowing counties to select a DRE with VVPAT
voting system as well.
May: ES&S sues state over deadlines and
system selection process.
September: Counties select voting
systems from state list.
November: 44 counties use new DRE
voting systems with VVPATs.
March: A group of 24 state voters sue Secretary of State
Bruce McPherson (R) and county election officials to prevent
the purchase of Diebold voting equipment.
July: Computer scientists hired by the state hack into voting systems
in use in California and around the country, demonstrating that they
could alter vote totals, according to a report.
August: California Secretary of State Debra Bowen (D) issues “Top-
to-Bottom Review” of voting systems. Some are decertified but their
continued use is allowed for the February primary with extra security
precautions.
November: Bowen files a lawsuit against Election Systems and
Software for selling uncertified voting machines to five counties in
northern California.
November: More than 18,000 under-votes were recorded
in Sarasota County in the race to replace Rep. Katherine Harris
(R) in the U.S. House of Representatives’ 13th Congressional
District. Other counties report similar under-vote problems on
the same voting system (ES&S iVotronic).
January: Fourteen Florida counties hold their final primaries using DRE systems.
Sarasota County uses optical-scan systems, marking the third voting system in as many
presidential cycles.
January: In response to problems in Sarasota, Gov. Charlie Crist (R)
announces his intention to add paper to Florida elections.
May: Crist signs H.B. 537 into law, effectively ending the use of DREs
in the state as of November 2008. The remaining 15 counties using
the voting system – including some of the state’s most populous –
will move to optical-scan systems for the next presidential election.
DREs will continue to be available for voters with disabilities until
2012.
2006               2007                    2008
June: Bids solicited by Brunner to perform risk analysis of voting
systems.
November: Cuyahoga County experiences problems with vote
tabulation and with VVPATs.
December: Brunner releases report on voting systems and
recommends all counties move to central count optical-scan systems by
November 2008.
December: Brunner casts the tie-breaking vote in Cuyahoga County
to mandate that county move to a central count optical-scan system in
time for the March 2008 primary.
January: Secretary of State Mike Coffman (R) is sworn in.
March: Coffman adopts new testing requirements for electronic
voting machines.
December: Coffman decertifies Sequoia Edge II and Edge II Plus
voting machines as well as the optical-scan devices eScan and
BallotNow, manufactured by Hart and ES&S optical-scan devices as well
as the ES&S iVotronic electronic-voting machine. Coffman recommends to
the state legislature that the 2008 election should be conducted on
paper ballots.
April: Appeals court rules Ohio’s use of punch-card ballots in
some counties but not others violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
May: 57 counties use DRE voting systems with VVPATs;
Cuyahoga County has a number of election administration
problems including with its new voting system.
August: Election Science Institute releases DRE analysis for
Cuyahoga County’s May primary.
November: Jennifer Brunner (D) elected secretary of state.
February/March: Secretary of State Gigi Dennis (D)
certifies direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting systems.
June: Colorado voter group files lawsuit challenging the
Dennis’ certification of certain DRE voting systems.
September: Denver District Court orders Dennis to enact
security standards for electronic voting machines and to retest
the four systems certified by the Secretary of State.
November: For the first time, a majority of Colorado
voters use electronic voting machines.
January: Richardson announces a plan to standardize voting
systems that will include paper ballots for optical-scan
machines.
March: Richardson signs legislation requiring uniform voting
systems by May.
November: State has one of the nation’s highest under-
and over-vote rates in the general election.
January: Brunner issues directive mandating all counties using DRE systems offer
optically-scanned paper ballots for the March 2008 primary. ACLU sues the state and
Cuyahoga County to block county from switching to central count optical scan system.
Brunner waives requirement for states to use central count systems in November 2008
— requirement remains in place for Cuyahoga County for the March primary.
February: ACLU motion denied.
January 3: County clerks testify at public hearing and call for all vote-by-mail for
the November 2008 election.
January 10: Coffman tells lawmakers that a fix may be possible that would allow
him to re-certify voting machines.
January 15: Legislation is introduced in Colorado House that would allow Coffman
to retest decertified machines.
January 16: Jefferson County joins several other counties in filing a formal request
to Coffman to reconsider the decertification of the county’s voting system.
January 17: Coffman tells county clerks that he will support their push for an all-
mail election in November 2008.
January 18 — Colorado House gives preliminary approval to legislation that would
allow Coffman to retest the decertified machines.
Timeline of Major Events
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Methodology/Endnotes
Research was compiled through the use of primary and secondary sources including data derived from state law,
state election Web sites, news accounts and reports from government and non-governmental organizations.
All sources are cited below in the endnotes. 
The opinions expressed by election officials, lawmakers and other interested parties in this document do not
reflect the views of nonpartisan, non-advocacy electionline.org or The Pew Charitable Trusts. 
All questions concerning research should be directed to Sean Greene, project manager, research at
sgreene@electionline.org.
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